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Cooperation Breakdowns under Incomplete Property Rights

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  • Jean Pierre TRANCHANT

Abstract

In order to analyze conflict and cooperation between a State and a non ruling group in a general equilibrium, I unite pure rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict under an assumption of property rights incompleteness. I show that a unique and globally stable Nash equilibrium exists in this game. Cooperation breakdowns appear to be twofold: either a generalized conflict driven by a collapse of the State or a one-sided rebellion due to coexistence between a strong State and a weak minority. Natural resources raise the rebellion cost supported by the ruler inducing this one to be more benevolent.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Pierre TRANCHANT, 2005. "Cooperation Breakdowns under Incomplete Property Rights," Working Papers 200522, CERDI.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:733
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