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« Dé-privatisation » de la politique commerciale ? La mise en place du tarif extérieur commun de l’UEMOA

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  • Bertrand LAPORTE

    (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International(CERDI))

Abstract

Industrial lobbying has long been important in West African countries to induce government import-substitution policy. The objectives of governments were to defend infant industries and mobilise fiscal revenue. The doctrine, at a moment conflicting between World Bank and IMF, stopped the liberalisation included in the first structural adjustment programs. But during the 1990s, a consensus was born between the two institutions to support WAEMU regional integration. Although the WAEMU institutional organisation was unfavorable to decreasing protection, the support of the Washington Consensus and of the European Union has permitted trade policy de-privatisation through the application of Common External Tariff (CET). But the maintaining of different fiscal incentive systems in each country reduces the effectiveness of this new trade instrument (CET). The WAEMU Commission credibility depends on the fiscal incentive reforms which would allow an effective trade policy de-privatisation.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand LAPORTE, 2002. "« Dé-privatisation » de la politique commerciale ? La mise en place du tarif extérieur commun de l’UEMOA," Working Papers 200203, CERDI.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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