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Good Governance of Monetary Policy in Canada: Lessons from the C.D. Howe Institute’s Shadow Council

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Siklos

    (Wilfrid Laurier University)

  • Matthias Neuenkirch

    (Universität Trier)

Abstract

The Bank of Canada should consider publicly disclosing the discussions and dissenting opinions of members of its interest-rate-setting committee, according to a new C.D. Howe Institute report. In “Good Governance of Monetary Policy in Canada: Lessons from the C.D. Howe Institute’s Shadow Council,” authors Pierre Siklos and Matthias Neuenkirch argue that the existing governance structure of the Bank is out of step with international practices that have spread quickly over the past decade.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Siklos & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2014. "Good Governance of Monetary Policy in Canada: Lessons from the C.D. Howe Institute’s Shadow Council," e-briefs 188, C.D. Howe Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdh:ebrief:188
    as

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    File URL: https://www.cdhowe.org/good-governance-monetary-policy-canada-lessons-cd-howe-institute%E2%80%99s-shadow-council
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Neuenkirch, Matthias & Siklos, Pierre L., 2013. "What's in a second opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 135-148.
    2. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018. "Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
    3. Anne Sibert, 2006. "Central Banking by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 145-168, August.
    4. Matthias Neuenkirch & Pierre Siklos, 2014. "When is Lift-Off? Evaluating Forward Guidance from the Shadow," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 819-839, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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