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Temporal Belief Revision Rationalized by Plausibility Orderings

Author

Listed:
  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

Within the class of structures introduced in [G. Bonanno, Axiomaticcharacterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic, Artificial Intelligence, 171 (2007), 144-160] we consider thesubclass satisfying the property that, for every state-instant pair (omega,t), there is an ordering of the set of states that rationalizes the revised beliefs at every (omega,t') where t' is an immediate successor of t. We characterize this class both semantically and syntactically.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno, 2007. "Temporal Belief Revision Rationalized by Plausibility Orderings," Working Papers 161, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:161
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    File URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/RhyPNyphYpxYzAYm59iYNWbw/07-9.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Giacomo Bonanno, 2007. "Four Logics for Minimal Belief Revision," Working Papers 76, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno, 2007. "Four Logics for Minimal Belief Revision," Working Papers 209, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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      Keywords

      plausibility ordering; information; belief revision; branching time; AGM theory;
      All these keywords.

      JEL classification:

      • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
      • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
      • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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