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Pool Reform and Competition in Electricity, forthcoming in M. Beesley (ed.), Lectures on Regulation Series VII, London, Institute of Economic Affairs

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Abstract

The market power of the incumbents means that average pool prices are set by the costs of entry. Reforms which raise entry costs will be proposed and should be resisted. Reforms to capacity payments may have little effect on prices, but could affect system security. The values of Value of Lost Load and Loss of Load Probability appear grossly incorrect, and if changed might affect reserve margins and allocation of investment. Transmission constraints and locational payments emerge as the most difficult and important cause for concern and least controlled by entry threats. Little reform is possible without primary legislation to change Pool governance radically.

Suggested Citation

  • Newbery, D. M., 1997. "Pool Reform and Competition in Electricity, forthcoming in M. Beesley (ed.), Lectures on Regulation Series VII, London, Institute of Economic Affairs," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9734, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:9734
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    Cited by:

    1. Herguera, Iñigo, 1999. "Régimen institucional del mercado spot y del mercado de futuros en distintos países," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía. DE 3892, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Nicolai J. Foss, 2003. "Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and Decline of the Oticon Spaghetti Organization," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 331-349, June.
    3. Hjalmarsson, Erik, 2000. "Nord Pool: A Power Market Without Market Power," Working Papers in Economics 28, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

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