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‘Mobile Termination Charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays’(original and revised versions)

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  • Littlechild, S.C.

Abstract

Concern over mobile termination charges under Calling Party Pays (CPP) has led to severe price controls on termination charges. These are of limited effectiveness in aligning termination charges with costs, net welfare gains from controls are small and costs of setting controls are high. Receiving Party Pays (RPP) avoids these problems. Average revenue (price) per call is significantly lower, average minutes of usage per subscriber are significantly higher, and mobile penetration rate is not significantly different. Handset subsidies seem to be lower in the US (with RPP) than in the UK (with CPP). Regulatory objections to RPP are not justified. However, there is concern about paying to receive calls. A ‘bill and keep’ regime offers the benefits of RPP without this disadvantage. Some mobile operators in RPP countries now offer free incoming calls. Bill and keep enables operators and customers themselves to choose between CPP and RPP.

Suggested Citation

  • Littlechild, S.C., 2004. "‘Mobile Termination Charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays’(original and revised versions)," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0426, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0426
    Note: IO
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mobile termination charges; calling party pays; receiving party pays;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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