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Evasão fiscal sob estruturas comportamentais

Author

Listed:
  • Gabriela Pantoja

    (Departamento de Economia (Department of Economics) Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Ciência da Informação e Documentação (FACE) (Faculty of Economics, Administration, Accounting and Information Science) Universidade de Brasília)

  • Rodrigo Peñaloza

    (Departamento de Economia (Department of Economics) Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Ciência da Informação e Documentação (FACE) (Faculty of Economics, Administration, Accounting and Information Science) Universidade de Brasília)

Abstract

We study the strategic interactions between the scal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We t this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized fact according to which the choice to evade is subject to behavioral patterns.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriela Pantoja & Rodrigo Peñaloza, 2011. "Evasão fiscal sob estruturas comportamentais," Working papers - Textos para Discussao do Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Brasilia 346, Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Brasilia.
    • Handle: RePEc:brs:wpaper:346
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    File URL: http://vsites.unb.br/face/eco/textos/didaticos/WP%20346.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2011
    Download Restriction: no
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax evasion; Bayesian equilibrium; behavioral consistency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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