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Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly

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  • L. Lambertini
  • G. Primavera

Abstract

We describe a duopoly model where stockholders assess the relative profitability of delegation versus process innovation. Delegation may not be a dominant strategy. When it is, the game is not necessarily a prisoners dilemma. Our model yields several equilibria where at least one firm remains entrepreneurial and finds it preferable to undertake cost-reducing R&D activities. Then, we introduce the possibility of using delegation and cost-reducing R&D jointly. The use of R&D investment by entrepreneurial firms is a dominated strategy, so that firms always separate ownership from control, while they don t necessarily combine delegation with process innovation.

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  • L. Lambertini & G. Primavera, 2000. "Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly," Working Papers 377, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:377
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