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Dense Orbits of the Bayesian Updating Group Action

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  • Ziv Hellman

    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Yehuda John Levy

Abstract

We study dynamic properties of the group action on the simplex that is induced by Bayesian updating. We show that generically the orbits are dense in the simplex, although one must make use of the entire group, hence departing from straightforward Bayesian updating. We demonstrate also the necessity of the genericity of the signalling structure, a relationship to descriptive set theoretical concepts and applications thereof to repeated games of incomplete information, as well a strengthening concerning the group action on itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Ziv Hellman & Yehuda John Levy, 2020. "Dense Orbits of the Bayesian Updating Group Action," Working Papers 2020-04, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2020-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ziv Hellman & Yehuda John Levy, 2019. "Measurable Selection for Purely Atomic Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(2), pages 593-629, March.
    2. FORGES, Françoise, 1982. "Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals," LIDAM Reprints CORE 503, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian updating; group actions; descriptive set theory; repeated games.;
    All these keywords.

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