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Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy

Author

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  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

    (University of Birmingham)

  • Mandar Oak

    (Williams College)

Abstract

We analyse how the importance of party ideology relative to benefits from holding o±ce influences the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democ- racy when no party has an absolute majority. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority as well as surplus and they need not be ideologically 'connected'. The type of government that is formed in equi- librium depends upon the importance of rents of o±ce relative to ideology as well as the seat shares of the parties. We ¯nd that when rents are high, governments cannot be surplus. When rents are low or the formateur is close to the median, minority governments occur for a wider ideological dispersion. Further, there is a non monotonic relationship between connectedness of coalitions and rents. Finally, we compare and contrast our model with existing models.

Suggested Citation

  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy," Discussion Papers 04-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    • Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:04-18
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coalitions; ideology; rents;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H19 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Other

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