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A case for standard theory?

Author

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  • Kuzmics, Christoph

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Rodenburger, Daniel

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each subject is recurrently (24 times) randomly matched with ever changing opponents to play a 14 player game. We find that assuming risk-neutrality for all players leads to a predicted evolutionary stable equilibrium that, while it can be rejected at the 5% level of significance, is nevertheless remarkably close to "explaining" the data. Moreover, when we assume that players are risk-averse and we calibrate their risk-aversion in one treatment with a simple game, this theory cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance for another treatment with a more complicated game, despite the fact that we have close to 400 data points.

Suggested Citation

  • Kuzmics, Christoph & Rodenburger, Daniel, 2015. "A case for standard theory?," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 542, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:542
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2759151/2759152
    File Function: First Version, 2015
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    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; attainable equilibrium; symmetries; testing; opinion polls; voting; elections;
    All these keywords.

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