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Implementation of the Kalai Smorodinski bargaining solution in dominant strategies

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  • Haake, Claus-Jochen

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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  • Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2017. "Implementation of the Kalai Smorodinski bargaining solution in dominant strategies," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 301, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:301
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2909866/2910152
    File Function: First Version, 1998
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    2. Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2009. "Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 177-187, March.
    3. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2010. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 17-25, March.
    4. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
    6. Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 308, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

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    Keywords

    Verhandlungstheorie;

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