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Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game

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  • Rimawan Pradiptyo

    (University of York, UK)

Abstract

We attempt to revise the inspection game used by Tsebelis (1989, 1990, 1993 and Tsebelis in Bianco et al, 1990) to model phenomena in criminal justice. Recent findings from various studies, primarily conducted in the UK, are used to re-construct the game. In contrast to Tsebelis' (1989) propositions, we found that the severity of punishment may affect individuals' offending behaviour. Similar results can be found for the case in which the authority initiates crime prevention initiatives by providing incentives to law abiding individuals. Any attempts to increase the severity of punishment are less certain in reducing individuals' offending behaviour than crime prevention initiatives. This result holds so long as the authority does not alter the levels of enforcement and the severity of punishment.

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  • Rimawan Pradiptyo, "undated". "Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1142, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    • Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2006-1-1142
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
    4. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1975. "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 397-417, June.
    5. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1977. "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 452-458, June.
    6. Bianco, William T. & Ordeshook, Peter C. & Tsebelis, George, 1990. "Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 569-586, June.
    7. Brand, Sam & Price, Richard, 2000. "The economic and social costs of crime," MPRA Paper 74968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Puneet Agarwal & Kyle Hunt & Shivasubramanian Srinivasan & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 208-226, September.
    2. Shidiqi, khalifany ash & Pradiptyo, rimawan, 2011. "A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction," MPRA Paper 30481, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Dominic Spengler, 2012. "Endogenising Detection in an Asymmetric Penalties Corruption Game," Discussion Papers 12/20, Department of Economics, University of York.
    4. Bruno Chiarini & Elisabetta Marzano, 2016. "Is the Severity of the Penalty an Effective Deterrent? A Strategic Approach for the Crime of Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 6112, CESifo.
    5. Anthony Rossiter & Susan M Hester, 2017. "Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 93(301), pages 277-301, June.
    6. van der Weele Joël, 2012. "Beyond the State of Nature: Introducing Social Interactions in the Economic Model of Crime," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 401-432, October.
    7. Baker, Matthew J. & Miceli, Thomas J., 2021. "Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    8. John Bone & Dominic Spengler, 2014. "Does Reporting Decrease Corruption?," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 26(1-2), pages 161-186, January.
    9. Spengler Dominic, 2014. "Endogenous Detection of Collaborative Crime: The Case of Corruption," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 201-217, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Punishment; Deterrence effect; Crime prevention; Game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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