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A macroeconomic model of banks’ systemic risk taking

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge Abad

    (BANCO DE ESPAÑA)

  • David Martínez-Miera

    (UC3M AND CEPR)

  • Javier Suárez

    (CEMFI AND CEPR)

Abstract

We study banks’ systemic risk-taking decisions in a dynamic general equilibrium model, highlighting the macroprudential role of bank capital requirements. Banks decide on their unobservable exposure to systemic shocks by balancing risk-shifting gains against the value of preserving their capital after such shocks. Capital requirements reduce systemic risk taking, but at the cost of reducing credit and output in calm times, generating welfare trade-offs. We find that systemic risk taking is maximal after long periods of calm and may worsen if capital requirements are countercyclically adjusted. Removing deposit insurance introduces market discipline but increases the bank capital necessary to support credit, implies lower (though far from zero) optimal capital requirements and has nuanced social welfare effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Abad & David Martínez-Miera & Javier Suárez, 2024. "A macroeconomic model of banks’ systemic risk taking," Working Papers 2441, Banco de España.
    • Handle: RePEc:bde:wpaper:2441
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.53479/37914
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Galo Nuño & Carlos Thomas, 2017. "Bank Leverage Cycles," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 32-72, April.
    2. Repullo, Rafael, 2004. "Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 156-182, April.
    3. Frederic Malherbe, 2020. "Optimal Capital Requirements over the Business and Financial Cycles," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 139-174, July.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2017. "Capital regulation and credit fluctuations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 113-124.
    5. Meh, Césaire A. & Moran, Kevin, 2010. "The role of bank capital in the propagation of shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 555-576, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    capital requirements; risk shifting; deposit insurance; systemic risk; financial crises; macroprudential policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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