IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ays/ispwps/paper0613.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Pocketing and Deceiving: The Behavior of Agency in a Donor - Delivery Agency - Recipient Organization

Author

Abstract

This paper presents a simple model to analyze the corrupt behavior of the delivery agency in a donor-delivery agency-recipient organization. Corrupt behavior of the delivery agency can take two forms: (i) “pocketing” or where the delivery agency distributes only a portion of the relief fund to the recipient and keeps the remaining fund to itself, and (ii) “deceiving”, where the delivery agency provides false information to the donor regarding the need of the recipient. We show that both forms of behavior can emerge as equilibrium outcomes in this type of organization. We identify factors that influence such corrupt behaviors and draw some policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Baoyun Qiao & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Yongsheng Xu, 2006. "Pocketing and Deceiving: The Behavior of Agency in a Donor - Delivery Agency - Recipient Organization," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0613, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0613
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp0613.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    2. David Dollar & Craig Burnside, 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 847-868, September.
    3. Richard Zeckhauser (ed.), 1991. "Strategy and Choice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262240335, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joshua C. Hall, Serkan Karadas and Minh Tam T. Schlosky, 2018. "Is There Moral Hazard in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Debt Relief Process?," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 43(3), pages 1-24, September.
    2. Mark McGillivray, 2003. "Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity: Integrating Multiple Objectives into Aid Allocations," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2003-71, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 180-207.
    4. Hiroyuki Hino & Atsushi Iimi, 2008. "Aid Effectiveness Revisited: Comparative Studies of Modalities of Aid to Asia and Africa," Discussion Paper Series 218, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    5. Simon Feeny & Paul Hansen & Stephen Knowles & Mark McGillivray & Franz Ombler, 2019. "Donor motives, public preferences and the allocation of UK foreign aid: a discrete choice experiment approach," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(3), pages 511-537, August.
    6. Balázs Szent-Iványi, 2015. "Are Democratising Countries Rewarded with Higher Levels of Foreign Aid?," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 65(4), pages 593-615, December.
    7. Stijn Claessens & Danny Cassimon, 2007. "Empirical evidence on the new international aid architecture," WEF Working Papers 0026, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
    8. José Antonio Alonso & Carlos Garcimartín, 2011. "Does Aid Hinder Tax Efforts? More Evidence," Discussion Papers 11/04, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    9. Gradstein, Mark & Chong, Alberto E., 2006. "Who's Afraid of Foreign Aid?: The Donors' Perspective," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1573, Inter-American Development Bank.
    10. HEPP, Ralf, 2010. "CONSEQUENCES OF DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVES IN THE 1990s," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 10(1).
    11. Kilby, Christopher, 2005. "Aid and regulation," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 325-345, May.
    12. Paul Clist, 2009. "25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Comparing Donors and Eras," Discussion Papers 09/11, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    13. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Javed Younas, 2007. "Do donors care about declining trade revenues from liberalization? an analysis of aid allocation," Working Papers 2007-028, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    14. Kilby, Christopher, 2005. "World Bank lending and regulation," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 384-407, December.
    15. Jørgen Juel Andersen & Niels Johannesen & Bob Rijkers, 2022. "Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(2), pages 388-425.
    16. Philipp Harms & Matthias Lutz, 2003. "Aid, Governance, and Private Foreign Investment: Some Puzzling Findings and a Possible Explanation," Working Papers 03.04, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    17. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    18. Coviello, Decio & Islam, Roumeen, 2006. "Does aid help improve economic institutions ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3990, The World Bank.
    19. Marchesi, Silvia & Missale, Alessandro, 2013. "Did High Debts Distort Loan and Grant Allocation to IDA Countries?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 44-62.
    20. Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007. "Institutions, Trade, and Social Cohesion in Fragile States," ICER Working Papers 24-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0613. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Benson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ispgsus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.