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Guidance for the Establishment of a Legal Protection Scheme for Deposit Insurance Systems

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  • International Association of Deposit Insurers

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2010. "Guidance for the Establishment of a Legal Protection Scheme for Deposit Insurance Systems," IADI Guidance Papers 10-02, International Association of Deposit Insurers.
    • Handle: RePEc:awl:guipap:1002
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    File URL: https://www.iadi.org/en/assets/File/Papers/Approved%20Guidance%20Papers/IADI_Final_Guidance_Paper_Legal_Protection_26Feb2010.pdf
    File Function: Final version
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Michael W Taylor & Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Ms. Silvia Ramirez, 2007. "The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 2007/025, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Alessandro Gambini & Mr. Salim M. Darbar & Mr. Marco Arnone, 2007. "Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance," IMF Working Papers 2007/082, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Mr. Michael W Taylor & Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, 2005. "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice," IMF Working Papers 2005/051, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    deposit insurance; bank resolution;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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