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The New Discrimination and Childcare

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  • Patricia Apps

Abstract

The “new discrimination” refers to the use of government policy to increase the effective gender wage gap, measured in terms of the second earner’s net of tax income gain from working in the market place rather than at home. This paper presents an analysis of the tax treatment of family members and shows how the expansion of policy instruments, such as family tax benefits withdrawn on joint income and the low income tax offset, has raised average and marginal rates on the income of the second earner, typically the female partner. The study concludes that this new discrimination, together with limited access to affordable, high quality childcare, has severely limited the growth of female labour supply needed to fund family support, and is ultimately unsustainable in an ageing population.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Apps, 2006. "The New Discrimination and Childcare," CEPR Discussion Papers 541, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    • Handle: RePEc:auu:dpaper:541
    as

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    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/CEPR/DP541.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, 2005. "Gender, Time Use, and Public Policy over the Life Cycle," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 21(3), pages 439-461, Autumn.
    2. Boskin, Michael J. & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1983. "Optimal tax treatment of the family: Married couples," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 281-297, April.
    3. Florence Jaumotte, 2003. "Female Labour Force Participation: Past Trends and Main Determinants in OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 376, OECD Publishing.
    4. Patricia F. Apps & Ray Rees, 1999. "Individual versus Joint Taxation in Models with Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(2), pages 393-403, April.
    5. Nada Eissa & Hilary W. Hoynes, 2006. "Behavioral Responses to Taxes: Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 20, pages 73-110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. David T. Ellwood & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2001. "The Middle-Class Parent Penalty: Child Benefits in the US Tax Code," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 15, pages 1-40, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Kathryn Shaw, 1994. "The Persistence of Female Labor Supply: Empirical Evidence and Implications," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(2), pages 348-378.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joanna Abhayaratna & Les Andrews & Hudan Nuch & Troy Podbury, 2008. "Part Time Employment: the Australian Experience," Staff Working Papers 0805, Productivity Commission, Government of Australia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    childcare; Australian family tax system; marginal tax rates and labour supply;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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