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Application of Superconducting Technology in the Electricity Industry: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies and Power Company Equipment Upgrade Decisions

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  • Mingyang Li
  • Maoqin Yuan
  • Han Pengsihua
  • Yuan Yuan
  • Zejun Wang

Abstract

This study investigates the potential impact of "LK-99," a novel material developed by a Korean research team, on the power equipment industry. Using evolutionary game theory, the interactions between governmental subsidies and technology adoption by power companies are modeled. A key innovation of this research is the introduction of sensitivity analyses concerning time delays and initial subsidy amounts, which significantly influence the strategic decisions of both government and corporate entities. The findings indicate that these factors are critical in determining the rate of technology adoption and the efficiency of the market as a whole. Due to existing data limitations, the study offers a broad overview of likely trends and recommends the inclusion of real-world data for more precise modeling once the material demonstrates room-temperature superconducting characteristics. The research contributes foundational insights valuable for future policy design and has significant implications for advancing the understanding of technology adoption and market dynamics.

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  • Mingyang Li & Maoqin Yuan & Han Pengsihua & Yuan Yuan & Zejun Wang, 2024. "Application of Superconducting Technology in the Electricity Industry: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies and Power Company Equipment Upgrade Decisions," Papers 2408.01017, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2408.01017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Zhang, Huiming & Xu, Zhidong & Zhou, Dequn & Cao, Jie, 2017. "Waste cooking oil-to-energy under incomplete information: Identifying policy options through an evolutionary game," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 185(P1), pages 547-555.
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