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Multimarket Contact, Merger, and Airline Collusion

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  • Ziyu Yan

Abstract

This thesis investigates the dynamics of multimarket contact and airline mergers on collusive pricing of airlines. In align with Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Athey et.al.(2004), it detects collusive pricing via pairwise price difference and price rigidity. The piece of work extends previous work by incorporating additional controls such as distinction between non-stop and stopover itineraries and detailed market concentration measures. The findings confirm a significant relationship between multimarket contact and reduced price differences, indicating collusive equilibria facilitated by frequent interactions across markets. Moreover, the results highlight that airlines exhibit more collusive behavior when pricing non-stop flights, and are more likely to attain tacit collusion when they approaches duopoly in a particular market. The study also explores the effects of airline mergers on collusion, employing an event study methodology with a difference-in-difference (DID) design. It finds no direct evidence that mergers lead to increased collusion among unmerged carriers. However, it reveals that during and after the merger process, carrier pairs between merged and unmerged carriers are more likely to collude compared to pairs of unmerged carriers.

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  • Ziyu Yan, 2024. "Multimarket Contact, Merger, and Airline Collusion," Papers 2405.15825, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2405.15825
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    2. Kim, E Han & Singal, Vijay, 1993. "Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 549-569, June.
    3. Richard, Oliver, 2003. "Flight frequency and mergers in airline markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 907-922, June.
    4. Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, 2014. "Does multimarket contact facilitate tacit collusion? Inference on conduct parameters in the airline industry," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 764-791, December.
    5. Berry, Steven T, 1992. "Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 889-917, July.
    6. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    7. Ciliberto, Federico & Watkins, Eddie & Williams, Jonathan W., 2019. "Collusive pricing patterns in the US airline industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 136-157.
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