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The Value of Context: Human versus Black Box Evaluators

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  • Andrei Iakovlev
  • Annie Liang

Abstract

Machine learning algorithms are now capable of performing evaluations previously conducted by human experts (e.g., medical diagnoses). How should we conceptualize the difference between evaluation by humans and by algorithms, and when should an individual prefer one over the other? We propose a framework to examine one key distinction between the two forms of evaluation: Machine learning algorithms are standardized, fixing a common set of covariates by which to assess all individuals, while human evaluators customize which covariates are acquired to each individual. Our framework defines and analyzes the advantage of this customization -- the value of context -- in environments with high-dimensional data. We show that unless the agent has precise knowledge about the joint distribution of covariates, the benefit of additional covariates generally outweighs the value of context.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrei Iakovlev & Annie Liang, 2024. "The Value of Context: Human versus Black Box Evaluators," Papers 2402.11157, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.11157
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alexander Frankel, 2014. "Aligned Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 66-83, January.
    2. Nikhil Agarwal & Alex Moehring & Pranav Rajpurkar & Tobias Salz, 2023. "Combining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology," NBER Working Papers 31422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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