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Optimal Queue Design

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  • Yeon-Koo Che
  • Olivier Tercieux

Abstract

We study the optimal method for rationing scarce resources through a queue system. The designer controls agents' entry into a queue and their exit, their service priority -- or queueing discipline -- as well as their information about queue priorities, while providing them with the incentive to join the queue and, importantly, to stay in the queue, when recommended by the designer. Under a mild condition, the optimal mechanism induces agents to enter up to a certain queue length and never removes any agents from the queue; serves them according to a first-come-first-served (FCFS) rule; and provides them with no information throughout the process beyond the recommendations they receive. FCFS is also necessary for optimality in a rich domain. We identify a novel role for queueing disciplines in regulating agents' beliefs and their dynamic incentives and uncover a hitherto unrecognized virtue of FCFS in this regard.

Suggested Citation

  • Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2023. "Optimal Queue Design," Papers 2307.07746, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2307.07746
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mohammad Akbarpour & Julien Combe & Yinghua He & Victor Hiller & Robert Shimer & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money," Post-Print halshs-02973042, HAL.
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