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Spontaneous emergence of groups and signaling diversity in dynamic networks

Author

Listed:
  • Zachary Fulker
  • Patrick Forber
  • Rory Smead
  • Christoph Riedl

Abstract

We study the coevolution of network structure and signaling behavior. We model agents who can preferentially associate with others in a dynamic network while they also learn to play a simple sender-receiver game. We have four major findings. First, signaling interactions in dynamic networks are sufficient to cause the endogenous formation of distinct signaling groups, even in an initially homogeneous population. Second, dynamic networks allow the emergence of novel {\em hybrid} signaling groups that do not converge on a single common signaling system but are instead composed of different yet complementary signaling strategies. We show that the presence of these hybrid groups promotes stable diversity in signaling among other groups in the population. Third, we find important distinctions in information processing capacity of different groups: hybrid groups diffuse information more quickly initially but at the cost of taking longer to reach all group members. Fourth, our findings pertain to all common interest signaling games, are robust across many parameters, and mitigate known problems of inefficient communication.

Suggested Citation

  • Zachary Fulker & Patrick Forber & Rory Smead & Christoph Riedl, 2022. "Spontaneous emergence of groups and signaling diversity in dynamic networks," Papers 2210.17309, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2210.17309
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrea Baronchelli & Vittorio Loreto & Luc Steels, 2008. "In-Depth Analysis Of The Naming Game Dynamics: The Homogeneous Mixing Case," International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(05), pages 785-812.
    2. Argiento, Raffaele & Pemantle, Robin & Skyrms, Brian & Volkov, Stanislav, 2009. "Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 373-390, February.
    3. Zachary Fulker & Patrick Forber & Rory Smead & Christoph Riedl, 2021. "Spite is contagious in dynamic networks," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 12(1), pages 1-9, December.
    4. Michael Foley & Rory Smead & Patrick Forber & Christoph Riedl, 2021. "Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-18, April.
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