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On spatial majority voting with an even (vis-a-vis odd) number of voters: a note

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  • Anindya Bhattacharya
  • Francesco Ciardiello

Abstract

In this note we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majority voting. We show that under some assumptions usual in this literature, with an even number of voters if the core of the voting situation is singleton (and in the interior of the policy space) then the element in the core is never a Condorcet winner. This is in sharp contrast with what happens with an odd number of voters: in that case, under identical assumptions, it is well known that if the core of the voting situation is non-empty then the single element in the core is the Condorcet winner as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Anindya Bhattacharya & Francesco Ciardiello, 2022. "On spatial majority voting with an even (vis-a-vis odd) number of voters: a note," Papers 2208.06849, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2208.06849
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anindya Bhattacharya & Victoria Brosi & Francesco Ciardiello, 2018. "The Uncovered Set and the Core: Cox's Result Revisited," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 3(1), pages 1-15, December.
    2. Anindya Bhattacharya & Victoria Brosi & Francesco Ciardiello, 2018. "The uncovered set and the core: Cox's (1987) result revisited," Discussion Papers 18/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
    3. Songnian He & Hong-Kun Xu, 2013. "Uniqueness of supporting hyperplanes and an alternative to solutions of variational inequalities," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 1375-1384, December.
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