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A mathematical definition of property rights in a Debreu economy

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  • Abhimanyu Pallavi Sudhir

Abstract

We present mathematical definitions for rights structures, government and non-attenuation in a generalized N-person game (Debreu abstract economy), thus providing a formal basis for property rights theory.

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  • Abhimanyu Pallavi Sudhir, 2021. "A mathematical definition of property rights in a Debreu economy," Papers 2107.09651, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2107.09651
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    1. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2005. "Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 223-242.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    3. Furubotn, Eirik G & Pejovich, Svetozar, 1972. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 1137-1162, December.
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