IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/1906.00280.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Coalitions in Repeated Games

Author

Listed:
  • S. Nageeb Ali
  • Ce Liu

Abstract

This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation promises and punishments. We evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes across a range of settings, and apply our results to repeated matching and negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Nageeb Ali & Ce Liu, 2019. "Coalitions in Repeated Games," Papers 1906.00280, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1906.00280
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.00280
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ce Liu, 2020. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Papers 2007.03794, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    2. Tweedie, Dale, 2024. "Inclusive capitalism as accounting ideology: The case of integrated reporting," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    3. Liu, Ce, 2023. "Stability in repeated matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    4. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Scott Duke Kominers & Ran I. Shorrer, 2019. "To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories," Papers 1906.10333, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1906.00280. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.