Optimal Dynamic Contracts for a Large-Scale Principal-Agent Hierarchy: A Concavity-Preserving Approach
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- Thibaut Mastrolia & Dylan Possamai, 2015. "Moral hazard under ambiguity," Papers 1511.03616, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2016.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HRM-2015-11-21 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2015-11-21 (Microeconomics)
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