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The role of endogenous payoff over public coordination equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Jara-Moroni, Pedro
  • Matta Serrano, Benjamín

    (Facultad de Administración y Economía.Universidad de Santiago de Chile)

Abstract

This paper studies how the threat of a protest influences government spending. The government has to choose a policy to maximize its payoff, which depends on (1) the policy itself and (2) the protest’s outcome. Citizens observe the policy choice and a private signal before deciding simultaneously whether to protest. We provide an equilibrium in which citizens coordinate only in public information, and show that if, in addition to the protest’s outcome, the payoff of the government depends on its size, the set of equilibrium strategies is a proper subset. Classification-JEL D7, D83, C72

Suggested Citation

  • Jara-Moroni, Pedro & Matta Serrano, Benjamín, 2023. "The role of endogenous payoff over public coordination equilibrium," FAE-USACH Working Papers Series 992098739606116, Facultad de Administración y Economía. Universidad de Santiago de Chile, revised 12 Dec 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:ars:papers:992098739606116
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Protest game; Global game; Public information; Social Movements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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