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Endogenous stackelberg leadership: the symmetric case

Author

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  • Jara-Moroni, Pedro

    (Facultad de Administración y Economía.Universidad de Santiago de Chile)

Abstract

In this article we prove that, when firms are identical, there are no non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibria in the linear quantity setting duopoly game studied by van Damme and Hurkens (1999) , in which firms engage in the “Action Commitment Game” proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The consequence of this is that in the symmetric case, there can not be equilibrium selection through risk dominance in such game

Suggested Citation

  • Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2021. "Endogenous stackelberg leadership: the symmetric case," FAE-USACH Working Papers Series 991943756506116, Facultad de Administración y Economía. Universidad de Santiago de Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:ars:papers:991943756506116
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stackelberg; Cournot; Endogenous Timing; Mixed Strategies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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