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Trade Policy and Antitrust: Do Consumers Matter to Legislators?

Author

Listed:
  • Robert M. Feinberg
  • Thomas A. Husted
  • Kara M. Reynolds

Abstract

We provide one of the first efforts to measure the importance of consumer preferences in legislators’ trade policy decisions by estimating the degree to which the level of antitrust enforcement in the legislator’s state impacts his or her vote on free trade agreements. To the extent that antitrust and trade liberalization are both viewed as proconsumer in nature, we would expect to see a positive relationship between antitrust enforcement in their legislative district and Congressional votes in support of trade liberalization. We find evidence suggesting that consumer preferences do play a role in legislative decisions on trade policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert M. Feinberg & Thomas A. Husted & Kara M. Reynolds, 2010. "Trade Policy and Antitrust: Do Consumers Matter to Legislators?," Working Papers 2008-14, American University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:amu:wpaper:1408
    DOI: 10.17606/zj2h-nc15
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.17606/zj2h-nc15
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert M. Feinberg, 2023. "Patterns and Determinants of Canadian Anti-Cartel and Antidumping Policy: 1990–2019," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 309-327, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Free Trade Agreements; Competition Policy; Antitrust; Voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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