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Political Turnover and Fatal Government Transitions

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  • Helena Arruda
  • Rudi Rocha

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  • Helena Arruda & Rudi Rocha, 2024. "Political Turnover and Fatal Government Transitions," Working Papers 19, Instituto de Estudos para Políticas de Saúde.
    • Handle: RePEc:amc:wpaper:19
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    File URL: https://ieps.org.br/sdc_download/13743/?key=eoyj2ow5d4t3e34etqsu1pgbu41typ
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gabriella Conti & Rita Ginja, 2023. "Who Benefits from Free Health Insurance?: Evidence from Mexico," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(1), pages 146-182.
    2. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338.
    3. Rocha, Rudi & Soares, Rodrigo R., 2015. "Water scarcity and birth outcomes in the Brazilian semiarid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 72-91.
    4. Almond, Douglas & Currie, Janet, 2011. "Human Capital Development before Age Five," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 15, pages 1315-1486, Elsevier.
    5. Reader, Mary, 2023. "The infant health effects of starting universal child benefits in pregnancy: Evidence from England and Wales," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    6. Reader, Mary, 2023. "The infant health effects of starting universal child benefits in pregnancy: evidence from England and Wales," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118458, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Lakshmi Iyer & Anandi Mani, 2012. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(3), pages 723-739, August.
    8. Sebastian Calonico & Matias D. Cattaneo & Rocio Titiunik, 2014. "Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression‐Discontinuity Designs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82, pages 2295-2326, November.
    9. Sergio Sakurai & Naercio Menezes-Filho, 2011. "Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 233-247, July.
    10. McCrary, Justin, 2008. "Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 698-714, February.
    11. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
    12. Lambais, Guilherme & Sigstad, Henrik, 2023. "Judicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    13. Taylor C. Boas & F. Daniel Hidalgo & Marcus André Melo, 2019. "Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(2), pages 385-400, April.
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    Keywords

    political turnover; government transitions; birth outcomes; infant mortality;
    All these keywords.

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