IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/akh/wpaper/076.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

El Dilema de Condorcet - el Problema de la Votación por Mayoría Simple de Duncan Black - la Paradoja De Kenneth Arrow - y el Manejo de Agenda

Author

Listed:
  • Horacio L. P. Piffano

Abstract

This paper reviews the familiar “dilemma of Condorcet”, dealing with the voting by simple majority problem, studied by Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow, to highlight the importance of a discretionary manipulation of the political agenda in a representative democracy. The dilemma is used to explain the presidential election outcome of Argentina in 2003 and to warning the relevance of the enforcement of permanent rules of procedure in social decisions making, namely, respect for the Constitution and democratic institutions designed under its principles.

Suggested Citation

  • Horacio L. P. Piffano, 2009. "El Dilema de Condorcet - el Problema de la Votación por Mayoría Simple de Duncan Black - la Paradoja De Kenneth Arrow - y el Manejo de Agenda," IIE, Working Papers 076, IIE, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    • Handle: RePEc:akh:wpaper:076
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/doc76.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Horacio L. P. Piffano, 2016. "Las decisiones colectivas, la teoría de los juegos y el ballottage del 2015 en Argentina," Department of Economics, Working Papers 109, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Csaba, László, 2014. "Átmenettan és közgazdaságtan. Módszertani tanulságok egy részterület műveléséből [Transitology" and economics. Methodological lessons to be drawn from work in a partial territory]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 53-67.
    2. Crispin H. V. Cooper, 2020. "Quantitative Models of Well-Being to Inform Policy: Problems and Opportunities," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-13, April.
    3. Muriel Gilardone, 2021. "The influence of Sen’s applied economics on his non-welfarist approach to justice," Post-Print halshs-03690014, HAL.
    4. Kotaro Suzumura, 2020. "Reflections on Arrow’s research program of social choice theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 219-235, March.
    5. Kruger, Justin & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2021. "The relationship between Arrow’s and Wilson’s theorems on restricted domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 95-97.
    6. Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni, 2020. "Limits on power and rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 507-521, March.
    7. Alexia Gaudeul, 2009. "A (Micro) Course in Microeconomic Theory for MSc Students," Working Papers id:1986, eSocialSciences.
    8. Kenter, Jasper O. & Bryce, Rosalind & Christie, Michael & Cooper, Nigel & Hockley, Neal & Irvine, Katherine N. & Fazey, Ioan & O’Brien, Liz & Orchard-Webb, Johanne & Ravenscroft, Neil & Raymond, Chris, 2016. "Shared values and deliberative valuation: Future directions," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 21(PB), pages 358-371.
    9. María Gabriela Palacio, 2016. "Institutionalizing segregation: Conditional cash transfers and employment choices," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-91, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Donaldson, Jason & Piacentino, Giorgia & Malenko, Nadya, 2017. "Deadlock on the Board," CEPR Discussion Papers 12503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Tetsuya, Saito, 2007. "Military Expenditures of Dictatorial Regimes: A Strategic Theory," MPRA Paper 6155, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. David A. Comerford & Leonhard K. Lades, 2022. "Responsibility utility and the difference between preference and desirance: implications for welfare evaluation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 201-224, February.
    13. Freixas, Josep & Parker, Cameron, 2015. "Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 144-151.
    14. Rafael Salas & Juan Rodríguez, 2013. "Popular support for social evaluation functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 985-1014, April.
    15. Bhattacharya, Mihir & Gravel, Nicolas, 2021. "Is the preference of the majority representative ?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 87-94.
    16. David Canning, 2007. "Valuing Lives Equally and Welfare Economics," PGDA Working Papers 2707, Program on the Global Demography of Aging.
    17. Stensholt, Eivind, 2020. "Anomalies of Instant Runoff Voting," Discussion Papers 2020/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    18. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:1039-1089 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 563-575, October.
    20. Dino Falaschetti, 2012. "A Sex Difference in Risk Taking and Promotions in Hierarchies: Evidence from Females in Legislatures," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(3), pages 477-502.
    21. Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2002. "Subjective Questions to Measure Welfare and Well-being," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-020/3, Tinbergen Institute.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Condorcet; voting paradox; agenda manipulation; public choice.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:akh:wpaper:076. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Laura Carella (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/funlpar.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.