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Earthquake strikes twice: electoral (dis)advantage in municipalities without economic recovery aid

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Fantechi

    (University of Palermo)

  • Ugo Fratesi

    (Politecnico di Milano)

  • Felipe Livert

    (Politecnico di Milano)

Abstract

Is there electoral punishment for local politicians considered by their citizens to have performed poorly during emergencies? This is studied in the Italian case, where a law officially listing earthquake-affected municipalities also de-facto prevents those left-out from receiving major aid. Electoral results after the four major earthquakes affecting the country over the past three decades are analysed through a difference-in differences approach. Results indicate that mayors of municipalities severely affected by earthquakes and not getting financial support are electorally punished in the next election. The mechanisms are investigated alongside the influence of the local context.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Fantechi & Ugo Fratesi & Felipe Livert, 2024. "Earthquake strikes twice: electoral (dis)advantage in municipalities without economic recovery aid," Discussion Paper series in Regional Science & Economic Geography 2024-16, Gran Sasso Science Institute, Social Sciences, revised Mar 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:ahy:wpaper:wp60
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Earthquakes; Electoral Accountability; Voter Turnout; Local Governance; Disaster Recovery; Mayors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General
    • R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies

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