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Managerial reputation and the "endgame"

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  • Berck, Peter
  • Lipow, Jonathan

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Suggested Citation

  • Berck, Peter & Lipow, Jonathan, 1999. "Managerial reputation and the "endgame"," CUDARE Working Papers 43912, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ucbecw:43912
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.43912
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/43912/files/CUDARE%20884%20Berck.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
    2. Ricart I Costa, Joan E., 1989. "On managerial contracting with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(9), pages 1805-1829, December.
    3. Huddart, Steven, 1999. "Reputation and performance fee effects on portfolio choice by investment advisers1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 227-271, August.
    4. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-479, June.
    5. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    6. Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, 1986. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(4), pages 835-860.
    7. Falkenstein, Eric G, 1996. "Preferences for Stock Characteristics as Revealed by Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 111-135, March.
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