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Is There a Farm Gate on the Infomation Superhighway?: Globalization and Farm Management

Author

Listed:
  • Klein, K.K.
  • Kerr, W.A.
  • Hobbs, J.E.

Abstract

Traditionally, the farm gate has been perceived as a substantial barrier behind which farmers could exercise almost unfettered managerial independence and through which the farmers managerial skills did not have to extend. Globalization and the industrialization of some agricultural industries has meant that farms must be much more integrated with the wider economy than in the past. The increased movement to production of tailored rather than generic commodities has meant that others in the supply chain have a greater interest in on-farm managerial practices - meaning that they now pass through the farm gate. Increased information and the expansion of contracts at the expense of spot markets means that farmers must move beyond the farm gate to acquire information on desired product quality, prices and to engage in one-on-one contract negotiations. These trends are explored and the demands they make on the managerial skills of farmers are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Klein, K.K. & Kerr, W.A. & Hobbs, J.E., 1997. "Is There a Farm Gate on the Infomation Superhighway?: Globalization and Farm Management," 11th Congress, University of Calgary, Canada, July 14-19, 1997 346415, International Farm Management Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:ifma97:346415
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.346415
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-261, October.
    2. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    3. I. T. Weleschuk & William A. Kerr, 1995. "The Sharing of Risks and Returns in Prairie Special Crops: A Transaction Cost Approach," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 43(2), pages 237-258, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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