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Ressourcenverteilung in der EU: Eine polit-okonomische Perspektive

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  • Hefeker, Carsten

Abstract

Das Papier diskutiert die Ausgestaltung des EU Finanzsystems aus polit-ökonomischer Perspektive. Die jetzige Form der Umverteilung lässt sich aus ökonomischer Sicht nicht nachvollziehen; vielmehr kann dies als ein System von politischen Seitenzahlungen verstanden werden. Es wird argumentiert, dass das System in Zukunft nach einer Erweiterung so kaum noch haltbar ist. Stattdessen ist eine Beschränkung auf die tatsächlich notwendigen Aufgaben auf EU Ebene angebracht. Dies impliziert einerseits eine stärkere Zentralisierung, andererseits eine stärkere Dezentralisierung und Rückverlagerung von Aufgaben auf die nationale Ebene. Eine gewünschte Umverteilung zwischen den Staaten sollte pauschal und nicht länger über Agrar- und Sozialfonds stattfinden. Dabei steht die notwendige Reform unter erheblichem Zeitdruck, da sich nach einer Erweiterung der EU Reformen vermutlich noch schwieriger werden durchführen lassen.

Suggested Citation

  • Hefeker, Carsten, 2003. "Ressourcenverteilung in der EU: Eine polit-okonomische Perspektive," Discussion Paper Series 26229, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:hwwadp:26229
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.26229
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    Keywords

    Political Economy;

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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