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What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? - Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation -

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  • Michaelowa, Katharina
  • Borrmann, Axel

Abstract

Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • Michaelowa, Katharina & Borrmann, Axel, 2005. "What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? - Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation -," Discussion Paper Series 26176, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:hwwadp:26176
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.26176
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International Development;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate

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