Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and Information Acquisition
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Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.151530
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Other versions of this item:
- Fulvio Fontini & Katrin Millock & Michele Moretto, 2013. "Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and Information Acquisition," Working Papers 2013.53, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Fulvio Fontini & Katrin Millock & Michele Moretto, 2013. "Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and Information Acquisition," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00825782, HAL.
- Fulvio Fontini & Katrin Millock & Michele Moretto, 2013. "Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and Information Acquisition," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13044, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Fulvio Fontini & Katrin Millock & Michele Moretto, 2013. "Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and Information Acquisition," Post-Print halshs-00825782, HAL.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Fulvio Fontini & Katrin Millock & Michele Moretto, 2018.
"Collective reputation with stochastic production and unknown willingness to pay for quality,"
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 20(2), pages 387-410, April.
- Fulvio Fontini & Katrin Millock & Michele Moretto, 2018. "Collective reputation with stochastic production and unknown willingness to pay for quality," Post-Print halshs-01802602, HAL.
- Fulvio Fontini & Katrin Millock & Michele Moretto, 2018. "Collective reputation with stochastic production and unknown willingness to pay for quality," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01802602, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
Industrial Organization;JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
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