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On The Persistence Of Inefficient Norms

Author

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  • Goyal, S.
  • Janssen, M.

Abstract

This paper considers an infinite stage two person coordination game in which players are asymmetrically informed about the changes in the stage-game pay-offs. The main result is that, in all equilibria, if players start by conforming to a stage-game norm then, inspite of the existence of signalling possibilities, the informed player chooses not to signal an interval of strict pareto-improving changes in stage-game pay-offs, ,and this leads to the persistence of norms, which have become in-efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Goyal, S. & Janssen, M., 1992. "On The Persistence Of Inefficient Norms," Econometric Institute Archives 272485, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:eureia:272485
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.272485
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    Cited by:

    1. Corneo, Giacomo & Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "Snobs, bandwagons, and the origin of social customs in consumer behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 333-347, March.
    2. Goyal, Sanjeev & Janssen, Maarten C. W., 1995. "Dynamic coordination failures and the efficiency of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 223-239, October.

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