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The Impact Of Share Tenancy On Resource Allocation: Evidence From Nepal

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  • Acharya, Ram N.

Abstract

A fully interactive two group model is used to examine the issue of resource allocation under alternative tenancy systems in Nepal. The results support the Marshallian hypothesis that both mixed and pure share tenants apply variable inputs less intensively in their rented-in plots than in owner operated plots.

Suggested Citation

  • Acharya, Ram N., 1999. "The Impact Of Share Tenancy On Resource Allocation: Evidence From Nepal," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21685, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea99:21685
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21685
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Quibria, M. G. & Rashid, Salim, 1984. "The puzzle of sharecropping: A survey of theories," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-114, February.
    2. Shaban, Radwan Ali, 1987. "Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 893-920, October.
    3. Ram Acharya & Robert Ekelund, 1998. "Mixed and pure sharecropping in Nepal: empirical evidence supporting the traditional hypothesis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(1), pages 37-50.
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    Cited by:

    1. Niee Foning, Maxime & Kane, Gilles Quentin & Ambagna, Jean Joël & Fondo, Sikod & Abayomi Oyekale, Samuel, 2013. "The effect of incomplete land tenure contracts on agricultural investment and productivity in Cameroon," MPRA Paper 62752, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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