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A Game-Theoretic Analysis Of The Australian ~ Tobacco Domestic Content Policy

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  • Beghin, John C.
  • Sumner, Daniel A.

Abstract

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  • Beghin, John C. & Sumner, Daniel A., 1991. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis Of The Australian ~ Tobacco Domestic Content Policy," 1991 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Manhattan, Kansas 271257, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea91:271257
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271257
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    2. Michael L. Mussa, 1984. "The Economics of Content Protection," NBER Working Papers 1457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    4. Beghin, John C. & Sumner, Daniel A., 1990. "Content Requirements with Bilateral Monopoly," Department of Economics and Business - Archive 259453, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics.
    5. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    6. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1986. "Tariffs, quotas and domestic-content protection: some political economy considerations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 221-242, January.
    7. Brown, James N & Ashenfelter, Orley, 1986. "Testing the Efficiency of Employment Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 40-87, June.
    8. Anderson, James E., 1987. "Quotas as options: Optimality and quota license pricing under uncertainty," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 21-39, August.
    9. Hollander, Abraham, 1987. "Content protection and transnational monopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 283-297, November.
    10. Gene M. Grossman, 1981. "The Theory of Domestic Content Protection and Content Preference," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 96(4), pages 583-603.
    11. Vousden, Neil, 1987. "Content protection and tariffs under monopoly and competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 263-282, November.
    12. Thomson, William, 1987. "Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 50-58, June.
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