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An Analysis of the Forest Service Timber Sale Auctions and of the Effects of the Potential Inclusion of Stewardship Timber Contracts in the Set-Aside Program: a Case Study of the Pacific North-West Region in the time period of 2001-2015

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  • Mojduszka, Eliza M.

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  • Mojduszka, Eliza M., 2018. "An Analysis of the Forest Service Timber Sale Auctions and of the Effects of the Potential Inclusion of Stewardship Timber Contracts in the Set-Aside Program: a Case Study of the Pacific North-West Re," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274294, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea18:274294
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274294
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
    2. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011. "Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
    3. Elodie Guerre & I. Perrigne & Q.H. Vuong, 2000. "Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions [[Estimation nonparamétrique optimale des enchères au premier prix]]," Post-Print hal-02697497, HAL.
    4. Susan Athey & Dominic Coey & Jonathan Levin, 2013. "Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 1-27, February.
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    Keywords

    Natural Resource Economics; Resource and Environmental Policy Analysis; Research Methods/Econometrics/Stats;
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