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Norms of Allocation within Nuclear and Extended-Family Households

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  • Kazianga, Harounan
  • Wahhaj, Zaki

Abstract

In many parts of Africa, traditional household structures consisting of an extended family headed by a patriarch are giving way to other types of households -- e.g. nuclear families, female-headed households -- as a result of migration, urbanisation and population pressures on land. In this paper, we explore whether traditional norms which determine how resources are allocated within the household are affected by the evolution of household structures. We show that the allocation of resources, for production and consumption, are closer to being efficient in nuclear family households as compared to extended family households. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that individuals belonging to the same nuclear family have stronger ties, enabling them to commit to more efficient contracts infeasible for those connected through an extended family relation.

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  • Kazianga, Harounan & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2015. "Norms of Allocation within Nuclear and Extended-Family Households," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205534, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea15:205534
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.205534
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Julia Anna Matz, 2016. "Productivity, Rank, and Returns in Polygamy," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 53(5), pages 1319-1350, October.
    3. Lovemore G. Mwanandi & Cherrie Mwanandi, 2022. "Impact of Family Structure on Household Economy in Malawi: A Case of Chinsapo 2 and Area 49, an Urban Setting in Lilongwe City in Malawi," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 6(3), pages 247-260, March.

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    Keywords

    Consumer/Household Economics; International Development; Land Economics/Use; Production Economics;
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