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Dispatches From The Tomato Wars: The Spillover Effects Of Trade Barriers

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  • Baylis, Katherine R.

Abstract

Most trade barriers are, by their very nature, bi-lateral. Since most countries trade with more than one country in more than one product, these bilateral measures can have spillover effects, changing trading patterns among other countries and products. This paper looks at the effect of a bilateral trade barrier on trade flows within a three-country free-trading area. Specifically, this paper examines the trade distortion effects of the 1996 voluntary export restraint (VER) placed on tomato exports from Mexico to the United States. Has Mexico shifted its exports from the Unites States to Canada, and has Canada increased its exports to the United States? Has the VER caused Mexico to divert fresh tomatoes to the processing sector?

Suggested Citation

  • Baylis, Katherine R., 2003. "Dispatches From The Tomato Wars: The Spillover Effects Of Trade Barriers," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22120, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea03:22120
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.22120
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stephen Devadoss & Elijah Kosse, 2020. "Political economy of the US–Mexican tomato trade agreement," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 1059-1075, April.
    2. Kosse, Elijah & Devadoss, Stephen, 2016. "Welfare Analysis of the U.S.-Mexican Tomato Suspension Agreement," 2017 Annual Meeting, February 4-7, 2017, Mobile, Alabama 252726, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    3. Perez, Maria P. & Ribera, Luis A. & Palma, Marco A., 2017. "Effects of trade and agricultural policies on the structure of the U.S. tomato industry," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 123-134.

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