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Ad valorem versus unit taxes: Monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations

Author

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  • Philipp J.H. Schröder

    (Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University, Denmark)

  • Allan Sørensen

    (School of Economics and Management, Aarhus University, Denmark)

Abstract

Real-world industries are composed from heterogeneous firms and substantial intra-industry reallocations take place, i.e. high productivity firms squeeze out low productivity firms. Previous tax-tool comparisons have not included these central forces of industry structure. This paper examines a general equilibrium monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and intra-industry reallocations. We show that the welfare superiority of ad valorem over unit taxes under imperfect competition is not only preserved but amplified. The additional difference between the tools arises because unit taxes distort relative prices, which in turn reduces average industry productivity through reallocations (the survival and increased market share of lower productivity firms). Importantly, numerical solutions of the model reveal that the relative welfare loss from using the unit tax increases dramatically in the degree of firm heterogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp J.H. Schröder & Allan Sørensen, 2010. "Ad valorem versus unit taxes: Monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations," Economics Working Papers 2010-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
  • Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2010-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Delipalla, Sofia & Keen, Michael, 1992. "The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 351-367, December.
    2. Anderson, Simon P. & de Palma, Andre & Kreider, Brent, 2001. "The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 231-251, August.
    3. Michael Keen, 1998. "The balance between specific and ad valorem taxation," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(1), pages 1-37, February.
    4. X. Wang & Jingang Zhao, 2009. "On the efficiency of indirect taxes in differentiated oligopolies with asymmetric costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(3), pages 223-239, April.
    5. Blackorby, Charles & Murty, Sushama, 2007. "Unit versus ad valorem taxes: Monopoly in general equilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 817-822, April.
    6. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    7. Timothy Dunne & Mark J. Roberts & Larry Samuelson, 1989. "The Growth and Failure of U. S. Manufacturing Plants," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 671-698.
    8. Elhanan Helpman & Marc J. Melitz & Stephen R. Yeaple, 2004. "Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 300-316, March.
    9. Jukka Pirttilä, 2002. "Specific versus ad valorem Taxation and Externalities," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 76(2), pages 177-187, June.
    10. D. B. Suits & R. A. Musgrave, 1953. "Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes Compared," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 67(4), pages 598-604.
    11. Junko Doi & Koichi Futagami, 2004. "Commodity Taxation and the Effects of Entry: A Case of Variety Preferences," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 267-279, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Haraguchi Junichi & Ogawa Hikaru, 2018. "Leadership in Tax Competition with Fiscal Equalization Transfers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-15, July.
    2. Hiroshi Aiura & Hikaru Ogawa, 2019. "Indirect taxes in a cross-border shopping model: a monopolistic competition approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 128(2), pages 147-175, October.
    3. Shiou-Yen Chu & Tsaur-Chin Wu, 2023. "Ad valorem versus unit taxes on capital in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(6), pages 1435-1456, December.
    4. Aiura, Hiroshi & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2013. "Unit tax versus ad valorem tax: A tax competition model with cross-border shopping," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 30-38.
    5. Philipp J. H. Schröder & Allan Sørensen, 2014. "A Welfare Ranking of Multilateral Reductions in Real and Tariff Trade Barriers when Firms are Heterogenous," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 423-443, August.
    6. Rajit Biswas & Vandana Thandassery Ramakrishnan, 2022. "Taxes and unemployment," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(2), pages 182-194, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unit tax; ad valorem tax; welfare; intra-industry reallocation; monopolistic competition; heterogenous firms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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