Report NEP-DES-2022-07-18

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2022. "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-016, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
• Meryem Essaidi & Matheus V. X. Ferreira & S. Matthew Weinberg, 2022. "Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions," Papers 2205.14758, arXiv.org.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022. "Optimal Reserve Prices," Working Papers in Economics 22/07, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
• Chinmay Maheshwari & Eric Mazumdar & Shankar Sastry, 2022. "Decentralized, Communication- and Coordination-free Learning in Structured Matching Markets," Papers 2206.02344, arXiv.org.
• Haris Aziz & Alexander Lam & Mashbat Suzuki & Toby Walsh, 2022. "Random Rank: The One and Only Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Randomized Facility Location Mechanism," Papers 2205.14798, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
• Soroush Ebadian & Anson Kahng & Dominik Peters & Nisarg Shah, 2022. "Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting," Papers 2205.15760, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.