Report NEP-DES-2021-10-11

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Xiang Han & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2021. "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1038, Boston College Department of Economics.
• Xingwei Hu, 2021. "Feature Selection by a Mechanism Design," Papers 2110.02419, arXiv.org.
• Srhoj, Stjepan & Dragojević, Melko, 2021. "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," GLO Discussion Paper Series 946, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
• Lucas Bottcher & Georgia Kernell, 2021. "Tradeoffs in Hierarchical Voting Systems," Papers 2110.02298, arXiv.org.
• Hoon Oh & Yanhan Tang & Zong Zhang & Alexandre Jacquillat & Fei Fang, 2021. "Efficiency, Fairness, and Stability in Non-Commercial Peer-to-Peer Ridesharing," Papers 2110.01152, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
• Dylan Laplace Mermoud & Michel Grabisch & Peter Sudhölter, 2021. "Algorithmic aspects of core nonemptiness and core stability," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 21028, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
• Elena L. Del Mercato & Van Quy Nguyen, 2021. "Sufficient conditions for a "simple" Second Welfare Theorem with other-regarding preferences," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 21029, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.