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Report NEP-DES-2021-09-20
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Xinghua Long & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2021. "Balanced House Allocation," Papers 2109.01992, arXiv.org.
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021. "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Working Papers 83, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility," Papers 2109.07932, arXiv.org.
- Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," TSE Working Papers 21-1247, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Luis V. M. Freitas & Wilfredo L. Maldonado, 2021. "Quadratic Funding with Incomplete Information," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2021_24, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
- Edith Elkind & Abheek Ghosh & Paul Goldberg, 2021. "Contest Design with Threshold Objectives," Papers 2109.03179, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.