Report NEP-DES-2021-05-10

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Yariv, Leeat & Fernandez, Marcelo & Rudov, Kirill, 2021. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 15873, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Klemperer, Paul & Baldwin, Elizabeth & Bichler, Martin & Fichtl, Maximilian, 2021. "Strong Substitutes: Structural Properties, and a New Algorithm for Competitive Equilibrium Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 15831, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Asker, John & Lee, SangMok, 2021. "Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 15703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Ahrash Dianat & Mikhail Freer, 2021. "Credibility in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Test," Papers 2105.00204, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
• David Imhof & Hannes Wallimann, 2021. "Detecting bid-rigging coalitions in different countries and auction formats," Papers 2105.00337, arXiv.org.
• Malamud, Semyon & Cieslak, Anna & Schrimpf, Paul, 2021. "Optimal Transport of Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 15859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.