Report NEP-DES-2017-08-20

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2064R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2017.
• Ferrara, Gerardo & Li, Xin, 2017. "Central counterparty auction design," Bank of England working papers 669, Bank of England.
• Nosal, K.;, 2017. "Two-Sided Matching in Physician-Insurer Networks: Evidence from Medicare Advantage," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 17/19, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
• Sanchez Villalba, Miguel & Martinez Gorricho, Silvia, 2017. "Hybrid lotteries for financing public goods," MPRA Paper 80823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Julio Elias & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2017. "Understanding repugnance: Implications for public policy," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 614, Universidad del CEMA.