Report NEP-CDM-2004-02-29

This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Marco Novarese issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-CDM

The following items were announced in this report:

• Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Sturm, Daniel & Smart, Michael, 2004. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Inequality, Democracy and the Emergence of Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4187, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2004. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making, I: Imperfect Information Processing," CEPR Discussion Papers 4179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2004. "Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000083, UCLA Department of Economics.
• Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase," CEPR Discussion Papers 4188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 2004. "How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4226, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2003. "Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians with Multi-Task Problems," CEPR Discussion Papers 4075, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.